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ABSTRACT
This study examined the drivers of audit failures and fraudulent financial 
reporting in distressed Nigerian banks. The historical study carried out 
an analytical review of literature that included previous empirical studies, 
reports of investigations of the Banks by Financial Regulatory Agencies 
and content analysis of audited financial statements of the distressed banks. 
The major findings of this study are that the incidence of audit failure in 
distressed Nigerian banks were driven by the auditor’s ineffectiveness 
attributable to inadequate regulation, a lenient legal liability system that 
failed to make auditors liable for audit failure, and corporate corruption 
whose detection, the auditing standards failed to clearly make the auditor’s 
responsible. Fraudulent financial reporting was considered to have been 
caused by corporate corruption. The board and management of the banks 
used fraudulent financial statements to cover-up the negative effects of 
their corrupt and unethical practices. The policy implication of the findings 
are that auditing standards and auditors’ legal liability framework require 
a drastic review that would make auditor’s responsible for the detection 
of corporate corruption clearer and their liability for audit failure more 
automatic. 
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INTRODUCTION
Audit failure is a well-known global incidence that has been identified with 
highly rated national and international external audit firms. The corporate 
world has experienced several incidents of audit failures that led to corporate 
distresses and in some cases contributed to the eventual failure of firms. 
Factors that lead to corporate distress and eventual failure usually build up 
over time but with timely discovery and early intervention, failure of firms 
could be prevented. However, due to the fraudulent financial statements 
prepared by the board of directors to cover up the poor state of the firms, 
together with the favourable/unqualified opinions of the external auditors, 
the problems of the firm remain unattended to and grow to a point that 
they become very costly to manage, resulting in distress or outright failure. 
Audit failure has very serious socio-economic consequences on 
investors, the auditors as well as society at large. Financial statements 
provide the basis for making investment decisions by the investing public, 
stakeholders and other users of accounting information (Chyan-long,2018). 
Individuals, corporate investors and stock brokers who relied on the audited 
fraudulent financial statements, in making their investment decisions lost 
out due to the eventual distress or outright failure of the banks. Nigerian 
investors have lost billions of funds due to the non-disclosure by auditors 
of fraudulent manipulation and overstatement of earnings in their audited 
financial statements on which investment decisions were based (Bakr, 2007). 
The 2011 capital market collapse in Nigeria was traced to some banks 
that recklessly granted margin loans and manipulated their share prices 
leading to the loss of confidence in the Nigerian capital market (Okafor, 
2013). Auditors had a price to pay for audit failures in the form of declined 
reputation. Corporate failures in the financial sector brought auditors into 
sharp focus and caused the public to question the quality and independence 
of external auditors (Ajibolade, 2008). Auditors that have reputation for low 
audit quality are known to have been switched by audit clients. (Skinner & 
Scrinivassan, 2010). Auditors are at the risk of facing potential litigation 
if their reports continue to fail to provide early warning signals to current 
and potential investors that may have to rely on them for their investment 
decisions (Bello, 2011).
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Fraudulent activities that includes fraudulent financial reporting and 
asset misappropriation remain a global problem encountered by corporate 
bodies across the globe which impairs sound economic view, distort 
investment decisions, erodes investor’s confidence impairs the economic 
development of any nation. (Zager, Malis & Novak, 2015; Abdul-malik, 
2017; Akbar, 2017). The failure of auditors to uncover fraudulent financial 
statements, in the view of Johnson (2011) remains a cancer on the 
accounting industry. Sikka, cited in Johnson, (2011:1) notes that the survey 
on Auditors and audit failure shows that “as many as 70 percent of auditors 
admit to falsified audit work in the surveys of countries around the world”. 
McDonnell (2013) considers audit failure as striking the very heart of the 
audit profession and its occurrence, as an admission of failure to perform to 
the expectations of those relying upon the accounting profession. The failure 
of auditors in providing enough and relevant information for predicting the 
likely failure of companies has gained prominence in developed, developing 
countries and international organisations (Lee, 2016).
While there have been much studies on the occurrence of audit failure 
in Nigerian banks, not much appear to have been done towards identifying 
the driving forces behind its occurrence. The need for this study becomes 
compelling due to the fact that the linkage of audit failures to fraudulent 
financial reporting that featured in Nigeria banks in the 1980’s and late 
1990’s which pre-dated the Enron-Arthur Anderson  saga of  2002,  recurred 
in  2009, implying that this scenario could repeat itself  in the future with 
perhaps greater  socio-economic consequences, if the drivers/causes of the 
incidence remains realistically unaddressed, and unresolved. 
The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the factors that 
drove or were responsible for audit failure the use of fraudulent financial 
statements by the board of Nigerian banks to cover up of their unethical 
practices, reasons why they are not detected by auditors, which led to audit 
failure. This study is of international relevance as the findings could assist 
other developed and developing countries address the risk of undetected 
fraudulent financial reporting. The methodology adopted is the analytical 
review of literature that includes previous empirical studies, reports of 
investigations of the Nigerian Banks by Financial Regulatory Agencies and 
content analysis of the audited financial statements of the distressed banks.
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The remaining sections of the paper are structured as follows: section 2 
covers a literature review on the drivers of audit failure, fraudulent financial 
reporting as well as an overview of the incidence of audit failures in Nigerian 
banks; board of Directors, fraudulent financial reporting and bank distress 
while section 3 covers the conclusion of the paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Drivers of Audit failure 
Audit failure can be explained as the failure to perform the statutory 
roles that are expected of the auditor by the client-firm. Generally, the 
principal  role of any audit engagement is to provide a professional opinion 
on the financial statements and non-financial reports provided by the 
management of an organisation, and where an audit opinion is proved to be 
incorrect, it is referred to as Audit failure (Chapple & Mui, 2017) Chapple 
and Mui also posit that Audit failure has two dimensions: first, that the 
financial statements contained material errors, and second, that the auditor 
failed to detect the errors in the course of  the audit process.
Five key drivers have been identified by the Financial Reporting 
Council of the United Kingdom (2008) as contributing to audit quality 
and invariably audit failure too (as poor audit quality is prelude to audit 
failure). These are: 1) The culture and ethical tone of the firm’s leadership 
and recognition for  quality; 2) Skills and personal qualities of audit partners 
and staff; such skills include adherence to ethical principles, the application 
of professional skepticism, supervision and support for audit staff; 3) The 
effectiveness of the audit process; 4) The reliability and usefulness of audit 
reporting and 5) Factors that are external and outside the control of   the 
audit firm. The board and management of audit clients appropriately relate 
to the factor within the reporting/audited entities which are outside the 
control of auditors. 
The study of Asare, Wright, & Zimbelman (2015) showed the elements 
of the audit process that determine audit failure to include: 
1. effectiveness of  the assessment of  management’s incentives to commit 
fraud; 
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2. ability to recognize management’s opportunities to commit fraud, and 
3. auditors’ modification of standard audit program to trail fraud cues.
Several other factors have been found in the literature that drive audit 
failure. These are:
Audit regulations and legal liability system 
Lee (2016) considers external audit requirements, insufficient 
regulations relating to audit independence, and limited liability risks to 
auditors as very important factors that affect the auditor’s role in enhancing 
accuracy of the audit to forestall audit failure. In particular, any regulation 
that is not categorical and definitive on the auditor’s liability for fraud 
detection does not encourage the auditor to modify his audit programme 
for fraud detection.
The study of Burton, Wilks, and Zimbelman (2013) shows that a 
lenient legal liability system as against a legal system which makes auditors 
incur an automatic penalty each time an audit failure occurs, or undetected 
material fraud is later discovered, would make auditors to be more vigilant 
and diligent in detecting fraud and the audit-client to have less inclination 
to commit fraud. 
Audit fee
Lucy (2016) maintains that low quality audit characterized by low 
audit fee can facilitate audit failure as it does not have sufficient effect on 
banks from committing financial statement fraud and recommends that bank 
audit should be expensive enough to attract auditors with requisite skills and 
with the required incentive to uncover fraud. High quality audit in his view 
is a disincentive to banks from engaging in fraudulent financial reporting. 
Angelo (1981a) argued that the level of economic bonding between 
the auditor and the auditee (client) has a tendency to impact on the auditor’s 
independence and that, the extent to which auditors earn client-specific 
rent(fee)  and  auditors’ independence which is  the joint probability that the 
auditor will discover (competence) and report a misstatement (objectivity 
and independence). He maintained further that economic bonding between 
the firm and the auditor could impose limitations on auditor independence 
and invariably on the quality of their audit. Studies have shown that 
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companies may reimburse or financially induce auditors to reduce their 
possibility of detecting financial statement fraud.
De Angelo (1981b) provided a multi-period analysis of the economic 
relationship between the auditor and the audited and argues that auditors are 
exposed to two main risks in situations where they earn significant client–
specific rent (audit fee) and that there is a certain pressure to compromise 
independence in order to maintain the continuity of that rent (audit fee) and 
avoid the threat of switching to another audit firm. 
However, Craswell and Francis (2002) reported that the level of 
economic dependence between the auditor and their client does not affect 
auditor propensity to issue a qualified audit opinion, except in a setting where 
public disclosure of audit and non-audit fees is not mandatory. 
Corporate corruption and auditing standards
Corporate corruption and unethical practices are illegal and irregular 
conducts that will always require fraudulent concealment in financial 
statements by the perpetuators since their knowledge is capable of 
influencing the judgments of reasonable persons. However, the audit 
standards lack clarity about the responsibilities of external auditors with 
respect to the detection of corporate corruption, but rather unjustifiably 
implied that corruption is not likely to have any impact on the financial 
statements unlike misappropriation and other financial reporting fraud 
(Modugu, Ohonba, Izedonmi, 2012; Kassem & Higson, 2016). The non-
clarity of auditing standards on the responsibilities of external auditors with 
respect to corporate corruption could discourage external auditors from 
developing audit programmes towards the detection of financial statement 
fraud occasioned by corporate corruption which can lead to audit failure. 
It is however, the view Kassem & Higson, (2016) that external auditors 
are likely responsible for detecting material misstatements brought about 
by corruption that would have a material effect on the financial statements
Auditors skill
Auditors’ primary goal is to provide reasonable assurance that the 
financial statement audited by them are free from material misstatements, 
and their failure at effectively detecting fraud is largely accounted for by 
their lack of sensitivity in detecting tell tales signs as well as and red flags 
of fraud (Chu & Pyke, 2013; Awolowo, 2016). 
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Auditors unlike fraud specialists, and forensic accountants, by training 
are not equipped with specialised knowledge of varieties of fraud schemes 
and strong interviewing skills. The limitation of traditional statutory auditors 
in specialised fraud detection skill could be predisposal to audit failure. 
Results of a recent survey by DiGabriele (2011), of accounting educators, 
auditors and forensic accountants reveal a consensus amongst them that 
professional audit frame work should be driven by an evolving regulatory 
and standard setting environment that requires the integration of forensic 
accounting skills into the auditing process. The result of this survey tallies 
with the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) as 
well as the PCAOB emphasis on the need for the integration of forensic 
accounting procedures in Audits as a means of meeting the requirements of 
recent standards and regulation on   the detection of fraud (AICPA, 2004).
Drivers of Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
Fraudulent financial reporting does have significant negative 
consequences on the audited entity as well as the shareholders and 
stakeholders that include investors and the development of the capital market 
Umoren & Asogwa, 2017). The act of fraud in financial reporting is either 
referred to as fraudulent financial report (FFR) or financial statement fraud. 
The FFR as described by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
(ACFE, 2014) is a deliberate misstatement regarding the reporting of a 
company’s economic condition by misstating or eliminating financial 
information or disclosure of financial information to obscure the users of 
financial statements in making decisions.
Fraudulent financial reporting is carried out in many ways by the board 
and management of companies. It could involve the deliberate distortion of 
corporate records such as inventory ledgers, or  come in the form of falsified 
transactions that involve sales or purchases orders, or  the misapplication 
of accounting principles AICPA(1986).Cooper (2005) list of instances 
of  financial fraud include: alteration, manipulations of falsification of 
financial records; ii) deliberate omission s and misrepresentation of of event 
or transactions; iii) intentional misapplication of accounting principles, 
procedures and policies and iv) deliberate omission of disclosures or 
rendering of inadequate disclosures. Fraudulent financial reporting differs 
from other causes of misleading financial statements such as unintentional 
errors (Odia & Ogiedu, 2013).
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Many factors have been identified to influence or drive fraudulent 
financial reporting. The factors include: 
Management interest, attitude and ownership
Corporate management is founded on the Agency Theory (Jensen 
& Meckling,1976) It explains the management of corporations based on 
a principal-agent relationship, whereby the board and management are 
expected to manage the firm as agents, on behalf of, and in the interest of 
the owners/shareholders of the firm, to whom the agents have stewardship 
responsibility. The principal-agent problem however surfaces when there is 
divergence of interest and asymmetry of information between the managers/
agents and owners/ shareholders (Jensen & Meckling,1976). When the 
agent/management maximizes their own wealth at the expense of the 
principals they cover up their acts with fraudulent financial statements.
Corporate governance  
Studies that investigated factors associated with fraudulent financial 
reporting practices, show that management’s predisposition, motive and 
opportunity to provide incentive for the fraud (Yusof, Khair & Simon,2015). 
Companies that have greater proportion of founders on the board, CEO 
duality and weak corporate governance are considered more likely to be 
involved in fraudulent financial reporting than are other firms (Aprilia, 2017; 
Sitorus et al., 2017). Weak corporate governance is often characterized 
by weak internal controls and ineffective audit committee of the board. 
Evidence from previous studies have shown that weak supervision from 
audit committees provide opportunities for management to perpetuate 
financial reporting fraud (Akbar, 2017; Annisya et al 2016).
Studies have shown that the Board structure has a significant influence 
on financial statement fraud. A high proportion of independent non-executive 
directors in the board has a significant influence on the level of fraudulent 
financial reporting fraud (Wilopo, 2004). Evidence from the literature show 
that the Chief Executive Officer’s CEO duality role as chairman and Chief 
executive has a strong influence on company policy which predisposes the 
CEO to engage in fraudulent financial reporting (Akbar,2017; Sitrus et. al, 
2017)
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Performance pressure
Pressure on management to meet certain levels of performance can 
increase the tendency for fraudulent financial reporting. The study identified 
the pressure to meet desired level of financial targets and financial stability. 
This study is a confirmation of Diany & Ratmono’s, (2014) research that 
states that there is a significant influence from pressure to fraudulent financial 
reporting. The pressure to attain financial stability, which could be liquidity, 
and other basic financial ratios can lead to fraudulent financial reporting 
(Apprilia, 2017; Tiffani & Marfuah, 2015; Indarto & Ghozali,2016).
Overview of incidence of Audit failure in Nigerian Banks
In the late 1980’s Nigeria had eighty-nine (89) commercial and 
investment banks that were doing well, growing in volume and operation 
and posting as much as 30% of their turnover on the average, as distributable 
profit. It was to be discovered later, that fuelling this seeming growth, the 
boom and rapid proliferation  were the banks’ involvement  in high risk , high 
return lending as well as black market currency trading  and  above all  the 
external auditors’ favourable reports on the financial statements that showed 
falsely the ever increasing profitability of the banks. The banking boom of 
the 1990’s occurred paradoxically in the era of poor performing economy, 
insufficiency of professional bank managers with the required depth of 
banking experience, both at the executive, management and board levels 
to cope with the complexities of bank management. It was a matter of time 
before the banking boom ended up as doom for investors and depositors, 
all in the face of unqualified, favourable auditors’ opinion on their audited 
financial statements which were proved to be untrue (Akhidime, 2009). 
Between 2008-2009 five Nigerian banks namely, Afri-bank, Fin 
Bank, Union Bank, InterContinental Bank and Oceanic bank failed the 
stress test of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the Nigeria Deposit 
Insurance (NDIC) and identified as going concern entities. Whereas, while 
the five banks were having serious going concern challenges of insolvency, 
insufficient capital and were unethically and fraudulently managed by the 
directors (CBN,2009), the bank’s audited fraudulent financial statements did 
not reflect any auditor’s qualification or adverse report (Akhidime, 2012) 
for reasons this paper seeks to unravel.
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External Auditors and Audit Failure
Following the findings of CBN-NDIC (2009) special investigation 
of the fourteen distressed banks, external auditor’s performance had come 
under high beam; their competence and integrity and credibility became 
doubtful (Onu, 2009). Auditors have been berated for failing to blow the 
whistle and raise going concern flags when they discovered that some of 
the banks they audited were becoming over leveraged, insolvent and having 
going concern challenges. External auditors were blamed for their failure to 
scrutinize and disclose the loan portfolios of banks to shareholders.
As clearly reflected in Table 1, the very  banks that were favorably 
reported upon and given a clean bill of health through  the unqualified 
audit opinion by their external auditors, going from CBN-NDIC special 
examination reports were  as a matter of fact having serious going concern 
challenges as they were   insolvent,  had insufficient capital to sustain their 
banking operations, while being unethically and fraudulently managed 
by their boards and chief executives,(CBN,2009; Sanusi, 2009). These 
unqualified audit reports are considered to have formed one of the bases 
for the impressive performance ratings, dividend payouts and investors’ 
investment decisions, (Otunsanya and Lauwo, 2010).
Table 1:  Auditors and Distressed Banks
Bank Year end Auditors Date of Last Audit Report
Audit 
Opinion
Audit FEES
2007 2008
Afribank March31, 
2008
Akintola Williams March31, 2008 Unqualified N50M N65M
Finbank April 31, 
2008
Akintola Williams December, 2008 Unqualified N63M N67M
Unionbank Feb. 29, 
2008
Akintola Williams October, 2009 Unqualified N113M N118M
InterContinental Dec. 31, 
2008
PriceWaterCoopers May, 2008 Unqualified N112M N208M
Oceanic December, 
31, 2008
PriceWaterCoopers May, 2009 Unqualified N100M N168M
Source:Otusanya and Lauwo (2010) 
The evidence (as in Table 1) shows that the auditors that issued 
unqualified opinion on the first five banks which the CBN-NDIC special 
examinations report proved and adjudged insolvent included Akintola 
Williams Deloitte (AWD), PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC); and to a lesser 
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extent KPMG Professional Services. These banks belong to the ‘Big 4’ 
international reputable audit firms; while PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) 
and KPMG Professional Services are classified as bank audit specialists, 
(GOA, 2003). Some of the reasons adduced for the poor audit qualities 
or failures include fee dependency due to the enormous income from 
these banks. These factors according to Ekundayo and Atu (2010) could 
have created bonds between the auditors and the bank management, in 
exerting pressure on auditors to acquiesce with the management, having 
compromised their independence. 
Evidence shows, for example, that Price Waterhouse Coopers, 
auditors to distressed Oceanic International Bank Plc and Intercontinental 
Bank Plc increased their audit fees between 2007 and 2008 by 85% for 
Intercontinental Bank Plc, and by 68% for Oceanic international bank; 
while Akintola Williams, Delliotte and Touche increase its fee by 30%. No 
distinction is made in the published financial statements of auditing and 
non-auditing fees. The high audit cost incurred by Finland Bank of N63m 
and N67m in 2007 and 2008 to Akintola Williams, Delliotte and Touche the 
audit fees of N50m and N65m in 2007 and 2008 to the same auditors had 
no possible bearing on the financial positions of these distressed banks. The 
above findings on the high audit cost of the distressed banks align with the 
separate empirical studies of Akhidime (2012 p.26-127) on audit quality in 
banks which maintains that “the total fees paid to specialist bank auditors 
indicated a higher level of economic bonding between the auditors and 
their clients to the extent that the auditors’ independence could be eroded”. 
Board of Directors, Fraudulent Financial Reporting and Bank 
Distress in Nigeria 
Prior to the major policy shift by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), 
with respect to increases in minimum paid capital between 1998-1996, 
Nigerian banks experienced a steady increase in the number of distressed 
deposit money banks. Distressed banks are banks rated by the CBN as 
marginal or unsound, (Somoye, 2008). As per Table 2, the marginal and 
unsound banks increased in number from seventeen (17) in 2001 to twenty-
three (23) in 2002 and 2003, and then twenty-six (26) in 2004 thirty. By 2009 
the number of marginal and unsound banks rose to 14 (about 41.7% of the 
post consolidated 24 Banks. Year 2004 is denoted as the pre-consolidation 
year and 2005 to date as post consolidation period.
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Table 2: State of Nigeria banking Industry
CATEGORY 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2009
Sound   & satisfactory 73 67 67 64 25 15 *14
Marginal *8 *13 13 *16 - 4 1
Unsound *9 *10 10 *10 - 5 9
90 90 87 87 25 25 24
Adapted From: CBN (2006). Statistical Publication
Following the contagion effects of the global financial crises and the 
consequent crash of the Nigerian stock market, the Nigerian banks began to 
show signs of serious cracks (Akhidime, 2009). By the time the CBN-NDIC 
Audit reports on the 24 banks were made public in 2009, it was obvious 
that Nine of the fourteen banks audited were ‘found to be unsound and in 
financial distress because of capital inadequacy, reckless and poor credit 
and risk management, lack of transparency, fraudulent financial reporting 
and poor corporate governance practices, (Kolapo & Onuba, 2009). 
Eight of the chief executive officers and some of the ‘banks’ executive 
and non-executive directors were sacked and arraigned in court for alleged 
corrupt, fraudulent, unethical and unwholesome practices (Sanusi, 2009). 
To keep the nine banks afloat, a credit lifeline of N620billion (about 
$3.9billion) had to be injected into the nine insolvent banks by the CBN to 
avert their imminent collapse (The Nations, 2009). However, none of the 
auditors of the distressed banks was penalized, except a general indictment 
that attracted no penalty.
Although views are varied on the factors responsible for bank distress 
in Nigeria, most analysts believe that the crisis in the banking sector is a 
clear manifestation of poor corporate governance practices in the financial 
sectors. Going by the 1995 CBN-NDIC collaborative study of Nigeria 
Financial services industry Distress study as shown in Table 3 below, 
board members undue interference accounts for 32%, 29.5%, 50%, and 
26.3% distresses in Financial Institutions in general, Commercial Banks, 
Community Banks and Finance Houses in particular.
Considering the fact that bad credit policy is by itself a fall-out of 
the combined effects of board interference as shown by the report of the 
2009 CBN-NDIC special examination of Nigeria banks that indicted 
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the chief executive officers/managing directors and executive directors 
of distressed banks, leading to their being sacked (CBN, 2009; Sanusi, 
2009), it follows that the combined contribution of the board members’ 
poor conduct (by way of undue interference and unethical credit and risk 
management)  to the distress of Financial Institutions, Commercial Banks, 
Community Banks and Finance Houses stood at about, 57.1%, 58.9%, 
66.6%, 50% and 66.7% respectively.
Table 3: Analysis of Financial Institutions’ Assessment of Factors 
Responsible for Their Being Severely Distressed (Percentage)
Causes
All Financial
Institutions 
%
Commercial
Banks
%
Merchant
Banks
%
Community
Banks
%
Finance
Houses
%
Economic
Recession
25.0 323.5 - - 33.3
Political Crisis 17.9 17.6 33.4 50.0 -
Bad Credit Policy  *25.0   *29.4    *33.3 -    *40.4
Undue Interference
from Board Members
 *32.1   *29.5    *33.3    *50.0   * 26.3
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: A CBN/NDIC Collaborative Study of Distress in Nigeria Financial Services Industry (1995). 
The board and management of these banks had abandoned the key 
elements of good corporate principles of honesty, trust, and integrity, openness, 
performance orientation, responsibility, and accountability, mutual respect 
and had become corrupt, inactive and greedy, (Oghojafor, et. al 2010).  In 
the same vein, the banks were accused of having displayed excessively high 
level of non-performing loans which was attributable to, lax administration 
processes, non-adherence to the banks’ credit risk management practices and 
poor corporate governance practices (Sanusi,2009).
The inability of the bank directors to effectively supervise top 
management of these banks and for the fact that most members of the board 
of these banks were composed of surrogates of the chief executives who 
were unilaterally nominated by the managing director or the chairman who 
holds controlling interest in the bank as the suppliers of capital is considered 
a major contributory factor to the bank’s ugly situation.
Poor corporate governance noticeable particularly on the part of the 
chief executives (Table 5a &b,) and bulk of the executive directors therefore 
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provided the motivations for fraudulent financial statements to cover up the 
board’s unethical management practices, including influencing the auditors 
to express favourable opinions on the false statements thus resulting in audit 
failure. The contributions of executive directors to the banks’ distress and 
audit failure confirms several studies that includes, Akhidime (2012) which 
posits that non-executive directors are more favourably disposed to audit 
quality than their executive counterparts.   
A whopping sum of N235billion ($1.54 billion) belonging to Oceanic 
bank Plc, one of the distressed banks, was traced to the bank’s chief executive, 
leading to the seizure by the Economic and Financial Corruption Council, 
(EFCC) of103 properties belonging to her, (Nwankwo and Amaefule, 2009).
This chief executive is a family member (wife) of the chairman of the board 
and majority shareholder of the bank. This and other pieces of evidence at 
the disposal of the EFCC would have formed the basis for the indictment, 
dismissal and the prosecution of the chief executives of the distressed banks.
Table 5a: CBN-NDIC (2009): Banks Examination 
Report on: Marginally Distressed Bank:
Bank Inadequacies Penalty and Indictments
1 Unity Bank Plc. Insufficient Capital None
Table 5b: Distressed/ Insolvent Banks
Bank Inadequacies Board &Management Penalty and Indictments
1 Afribank Plc Illiquidity,Corporate 
governance 
challenges
Removal of MD/CEOs& EDs
2 Inter-Continental ,,       ,,           ,, ,,           ,,           ,,         ,,       ,,
3 Union Bank of Nigeria Plc ,,       ,,           ,, ,,           ,,           ,,         ,,       ,,
4 Oceanic Bank Intercontinental 
Bank Plc
,,       ,,           ,, ,,           ,,           ,,         ,,       ,,
5 Finbank Plc ,,       ,,           ,, ,,           ,,           ,,         ,,       ,,
6 Bank PHB Plc. ,,       ,,           ,, Removal of MD/CEOs& EDs
7 Equitorial Trust Bank Ltd ,,       ,,           ,, Removal of MD/CEOs& EDs& 
One non-executive directors/
Major Shareholder
8 Spring Bank Plc ,,       ,,           ,, Remova l  o f  MD/CEOs& 
EDs&Non-executive Directors
9 Wema BankPlc ,,       ,,           ,, None
Source: CBN Press Statements/The Nations, (2009)
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While the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 was looming, its 
contagion effects and the rot  in  the  banks were covered up by the directors 
and executives of Nigerian banks who adopted creative accounting and 
fraudulent reporting practices, earnings manipulations and gross non-
disclosures at unprecedented levels; banks were posting phenomenal high 
profits and paying out steadily and regularly, high dividends to shareholders 
and obtaining all types and shades of high performance ratings from 
institutional performance raters (Akhidime, 2009). Consequently, the shares 
prices of the banks became the toast of local and foreign investors and the 
most traded in the stock market. 
Legal Frame Work of Auditing and the Financial Reporting 
Model
The legal framework for the regulation of audit of banks in Nigeria 
prior to the period (2009) of bank distress includes the Companies and Allied 
Matters Act (CAMA, 1990) and the Banks and other Financial Institutions 
Act (BOFA) 1991 and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). Sections 359 
and 360 CAMA, (1990) place on external auditors the responsibility for 
making report to company members on the accounts examined by them and 
to specifically report on whether (i). proper accounting records have been 
kept and proper returns adequate for their audit have been received from 
branches not visited by them (ii). the company balance sheet (now statement 
of financial position) and its profit and loss (now statement of comprehensive 
income) are in agreement with the accounting records and returns (iii). the 
balance sheet (now known as Statement of Financial Position) and its profit 
and loss account (now known as statement of comprehensive income) give 
a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the company during the period 
under review.
The specific responsibility placed on external auditors by CBN 
Code of corporate governance is that they should render reports on banks 
risk management practices, internal controls and level of compliance 
with regulatory directives, (CBN,2006). The CBN also requires banks to 
submit their audited financial statements to the Central Bank of Nigeria 
for approval before publication in a national daily newspaper within four 
months of year-end. Nothing in the Nigerian statutory reporting model 
refers to fraud incidence or detection of fraud. The import of unqualified 
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audit report is that the auditors in the course of their audit did not find any 
negative circumstances or material irregularities that are serious or material 
enough to justify either a qualified, an adverse report, or the issuance of a 
disclaimer, nor existed any going- concern challenges. (Adeniji, 2010).  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This study set out to determine the immediate and remote drivers/causes of 
audit failure and fraudulent financial reporting in Nigerian distressed banks. 
Review of relevant literature that consisted of relevant previous empirical 
studies on the variables of the study, various reports of investigations done 
jointly and separately on the banks by the CBN and NDIC together with the 
result of the content analysis of the banks’ published financial statements 
formed the bases of the inferences from the study Nigeria.
Evidence from this study shows that auditors whose audits failed with 
respect to the distressed banks are bank specialist auditors and among the 
very expensive and highly rated ‘Big4’ reputable audit firms whose cause 
of audit failure could not have resulted from lack of adequate skill or low 
fee. This evidence negates the position of Lucy, (2016) which maintains 
that when auditors are expensive enough they provide high quality audit 
to serve as disincentive to fraudulent financial reporting. 
Some studies attribute enormous audit fees from client to economic 
bonding, and the reason for poor audit quality (Ekundayo &Atu,2010; 
Akhidime, 2012). However, this study conforms to a previous study ies 
which maintain that the level of economic dependence between the auditor 
and their clients can only affect the auditor inclination to issue qualified audit 
opinion only when and where an auditor has responsibility for disclosing 
audit and non-audit fees (Francis, Craswell and Francis, 2002). The Nigerian 
auditing framework does not have a provision for the disclosure audit and 
non-audit fees.
As with previous studies, this study provides evidence of poor 
attention to corporate corruption as the major cause of audit failure in 
Nigerian banks. (Kaseem & Higson, 2016) (Lee,2016). The study confirms 
a previous finding (Asare, Wright, Zimbelman, 2015), on auditor’s lack of 
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compelling incentive to develop audit programmes that would have detected 
the fraudulent financial statements that lead to audit failure. This perhaps, is 
as a result of the non-categorical positions taken by the Nigeria’s auditing 
legal framework on the detection of fraud and the responsibility of the 
auditors for the detection of corporate corruption. 
On the drivers of fraudulent financial reporting, this study confirms 
that poor and weak corporate governance as characterized by weak internal 
control and lax supervision are factors that drive fraudulent financial 
reporting (Akbar, 2017). This study confirms that board structure, particularly 
with the CEO as having a dualrole as chairman and chief executive officer 
predisposes the latter to engage in fraudulent financial reporting
This study also confirms results of previous studies that   pressure on 
management to meet performance targets could lead to fraudulent financial 
reporting (Diany & Ratmono 2014; Apprilia, 2017; Tiffani & Marfuah, 
2015).  
Policy Implication of the Study
The implications of the inferences from this study are that auditing 
standards, auditor’s legal liability, and the auditing-framework should be 
reviewed in such a way as to clearly provide for auditor’s responsibility 
for the detection of corporate corruption and their liability for audit failure 
more automatic. 
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